Magill  September 2002 The Truth Trickles Out Donall O Maolfabhail Mystery has always surrounded the 1974 Dublin and Monaghan bombings. An  independent inquiry has been set up to look at the events surrounding the  attacks, and the bombing of Dundalk the following year. Donall O  Maolfabhail reports on its likely findings. Earlier this summer, a BBC Panorama programme produced new evidence  suggesting that British military intelligence colluded with loyalist  paramilitaries in murdering a significant number of people in Northern  Ireland. Over the last three years, an independent inquiry established by  the Irish government has been investigating whether British military  intelligence colluded in the murder of citizens of this state also. This  inquiry - headed by Judge Barron - is expected to publish its report  later this autumn. The findings of Barron's report are likely to put the  government under intense pressure to set up a full judicial inquiry,  similar to the Saville inquiry into Bloody Sunday, to ascertain the whole  truth about these matters. There has long been a suspicion that British military intelligence, as  part of its war against the IRA, either directly engaged in carrying out  a number of bombings and assassinations in the Republic of Ireland, or at  least colluded with loyalists in so doing. According to this analysis,  the assassinations were aimed at eliminating key republican figures,  while the bombings were psychological operations aimed at putting  pressure on the southern establishment to adopt more repressive measures. The Barron inquiry, formerly known as the Hamilton inquiry, was set up in  1999 at the behest of Justice for the Forgotten - the organisation which  represents the families of the victims of the Dublin and Monaghan  bombings. On the day of the bombings in 1974, 33 people lost their lives  and many more were injured. The bombing of Dundalk, which took place in  December 1975, and in which two people were killed, was also added to  Barron's terms of reference. The powers of the Barron inquiry are quite limited, however. It does not  have the power to subpoena and so is entirely dependent on voluntary  co-operation. It appears that the judge has received co-operation from  the Garda and the PSNI, with the exception of Special Branch. But on 24  April last, the Taoiseach stated that "the material [that] came from the  British files, in actual fact, that was limited enough." This situation has since improved to some degree, but the judge is still  thought to be dissatisfied with the level of co-operation from the  British security services. For all that, Magill understands that the  inquiry has obtained strong new evidence that would indicate at least a  willingness on the part of certain sections of the British military to  engage in grave undercover actions. A security memo for the British government in 1971 - now in the hands of  the Barron inquiry - points out that the IRA is operating at a very high  level of intensity and that the border is practically open. It states  that in order for Britain to gain full control of the border, an  additional 18 to 29 battalions would be required. This would mean  withdrawing troops from other parts of the world, which would be  embarrassing for Britain within NATO. The memo therefore outlines three  other options as to how the British Army should proceed. The best of  these is felt to be the final one - that existing restraints on the  operations of British forces should be removed. This, the memo states,  would include an intensification of border operations. Any cross-border  actions would have come under the heading of border operations. The first  car bomb south of the border that was attributed to loyalists exploded on  13 May 1972, six months later. There was one fatality. In fact, almost  half of the fatal loyalist car bombs that occurred in the 70s happened  between May 1972 and January 1973. It is worth noting that during the  same period Chief of Staff Major General Thomas O'Carroll of the Irish  Army sent a memo to the then Minister for Defence, Gerry Cronin, stating  that dealing with the possibility of "incursions into the Republic by  organised security forces or partisan (i.e. loyalist) elements from  Northern Ireland.... would require an increase in military strength and  more border patrols." The bombs that went off in Dublin and Monaghan in 1974 were among the  worst atrocities of the Troubles. Yet confusion has always reigned over  who was responsible for them. David Ervine, one-time UVF member and now  leader of the PUP, stated to BBC journalist Peter Taylor some years ago  that the UVF was responsible for the bombings. Submissions made to the  Barron inquiry by well-placed sources and seen by Magill would seem to  confirm that both UVF and UDA members were involved. However, Magill has also learned that a former senior member of the  British Army, who was serving in Northern Ireland at the time, has told  Judge Barron that he believes loyalists could not have carried out the  Dublin and Monaghan bombings on their own. Rather, he believes it was a  sophisticated effort by the British military. The circumstances of the 1974 attack, and the bomb technology used, meant  that allegations of collusion were made long before the Barron inquiry  began its work. It is understood that a British soldier, who was on duty  not far from the border on the night of the bombings, has told the Barron  inquiry that his unit got no instructions to take any action that night.  The normal course of action after such an incident would be that NI Army  Command HQ would instruct all brigade headquarters to seal the border. As far as technology goes, Captain Fred Holroyd, who was stationed in  Portadown in 1974, has stated that "loyalists mainly used Double Diamond  kegs, beer kegs filled with explosives with a black powder fuse. They  were pretty primitive" Lieutenant Colonel George Styles, formerly head of  the British Army's bomb disposal network worldwide, and who served in  Northern Ireland from 1969-72, concurs with this view. "I don't think they were at a level that would equate to the sort of  techniques that were used here in Dublin." This view has also been  supported by Commandant Patrick Trears, who in 1974 was the Irish Army's  main bomb disposal expert, and by former Garda Commissioner Eamon  Doherty. Allegations of collusion have long hung over other incidents being  investigated by Barron. In December 1972, two bombs exploded in Dublin.  Two months later, it emerged that Garda Special Branch had information  that connected two men who stayed in the Belgravia Hotel in Belfast with  the bombings. Both men used false passports and are still wanted in the  Republic in connection with the bombings. There were other incidents where British military collusion was  suspected. On 1 May 1976, a Co Louth man, Seamus Ludlow, was found shot dead at  Culmore, near Dundalk. Ludlow is understood to have resembled a senior  republican living in the town. James Sharkey, a relative of Ludlow's, now  claims he has been told by the RUC that two of his killers were UDR men,  but since the crime happened in the Republic, it is up to the Garda to  pursue them. John Francis Greene, a top IRA commander from North Armagh, was killed on  a farm outside Castleblaney in Co Monaghan on 10 January 1975. At the  time the IRA was on ceasefire. Ruairi Ó Brádaigh, then leader of Sinn  Fein, claims that this assassination had a huge bearing on the breakdown  of that ceasefire six days later. Raymond Murray, author of The SAS in  Ireland believes "that MI5 did not like this truce, as it thought the IRA  was using it as a shield to regroup, and they arranged to kill Greene."  It wasn't until two months later, on 18 March, that the UVF claimed  responsibility for the murder. But in 1999, John Weir, a former RUC  officer, named a member of the UDR along with loyalist paramilitaries  including Robin 'The Jackal' Jackson as being behind the murder. Speaking to the Dail on 24 April last, the Taoiseach stated that the  Barron Report would, when completed, be submitted to the Joint Committee  on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights. It will be for the  members of that committee to then determine whether a more comprehensive  inquiry should be set up - the terms of reference of the Barron inquiry  do not allow Judge Barron to recommend a public inquiry. Magill  understands that the finished report will at least allude to the  identities of the various loyalists suspected of involvement in the  Dublin and Monaghan bombings. It is also expected to be fairly critical  of both the Garda and the RUC. As for the final issue of a British  military role in the bombings, Barron is unlikely to be conclusive. However, according to the Taoiseach, the judge will "assess and comment  in his report on the co-operation he has received from the various  authorities with which he has been in contact." In the case of the so far  limited co-operation received from the British, Judge Barron is expected  not to shy away from drawing adverse inferences. Magill understands that  his comments in this regard alone might well be enough to persuade the  committee to support the setting-up of a full judicial inquiry. If British military intelligence did collude in the murder of citizens of  this state, one can rest assured that there are a significant number of  people who will be anxious for the truth never to see the light of day.  They may yet be disappointed.